impossibility and necessity, whereas one-sided possibility is only bounded on one side by impossibility.
Aristotle often does not explicitly indicate whether a given occurrence of 'possible' is to be understood in the two-sided or one-sided sense, but in the Prior Analytics it is usually clear from the context which of them he means. In point [ii] , the one-sided sense is qualified as being merely equivocal (ὁμωνύμως). This qualification indicates that the one-sided sense is not the preferred sense of 'possible' in the system of modal syllogisms expounded in Prior Analytics 1.13-22. 6 Modal syllogisms concerning one-sided possibility play only a minor role in these chapters. 7 Instead, Aristotle focuses on modal syllogisms concerning two-sided possibility. 8 Accordingly, he refers to the characterization of two-sided possibility in point [i] as his official 'definition' (διορισμός) of possibility in the modal syllogistic.
9
Having introduced the two senses of 'possible' in points [i] and [ii] , Aristotle proceeds as follows:
[iii] That this [viz., one-sided possibility] is what is possible is evident from opposed pairs of denials and affirmations.
[iv] For 'it is not possible to belong' and 'it is 6 For this use of ὁμωνύμως, see Bonitz 1870: 514a49-61 and Striker 2009: 128. 7 Aristotle generally does not consider any modal syllogisms that contain a one-sided possibility premiss (the only exception is his use of a syllogism called Barbara MXM at 1.15 34b2-6; see Malink & Rosen 2013: 971-3) .
Aristotle discusses a number of modal syllogisms that have a one-sided possibility conclusion, but he does so only when the modal syllogism in question is established by reductio ad absurdum.
8 Thus, two-sided possibility is the preferred notion of possibility in the modal syllogistic in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22. By contrast, one-sided possibility is preferred in the framework of propositional modal logic developed in Metaphysics Θ 4 and Prior Analytics 1.15. This framework is based on the principle that if B follows from A then the possibility of B follows from the possibility of A (Rosen & Malink 2012: 179-95 ). The principle is correct for one-sided possibility but not for two-sided possibility (Hintikka 1973: 59-60) . Thus, the adjective 'possible'
(δυνατόν) must be understood as expressing one-sided possibility in Metaphysics Θ 4 and Prior Analytics 1.15
(1047b14-30 and 34a5-33). On the other hand, the adjective is never used to indicate possibility in the premisses and conclusions of modal syllogisms in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22 (instead, Aristotle uses the verbs ἐνδέχεσθαι and ἐγχωρεῖν; see Malink & Rosen 2013: 959-61). impossible to belong' and 'it is necessary not to belong' are either the same or follow one another, [v] so that their opposites, 'it is possible to belong' and 'it is not impossible to belong' and 'it is not necessary not to belong', will also either be the same or follow one another; [vi] for either the affirmation or the denial holds of everything.
[vii] Therefore, what is possible will not be necessary and what is not necessary will be possible. 10 (Pr. An. 1.13 32a21-9)
This passage has been the subject of controversy. The main question is whether the pronoun 'this' in point [iii] refers to two-sided or one-sided possibility. Since Philoponus, most commentators have taken it to refer to two-sided possibility. 11 Thus, they take points [iii] - [vii] to justify the notion of two-sided possibility introduced in point [i] . However, this is problematic because Aristotle's claims in point [v] are true for one-sided but not for two-sided possibility (e.g., the claim that 'it is possible to belong' is equivalent to 'it is not necessary not to belong'). Because of this problem, it is often thought that points [iii]- [vii] are spurious and should be excised even though they are found in all manuscripts (see n. 2 above).
On the other hand, some have argued that the passage can be retained if the pronoun 'this' in point [iii] is taken to refer to one-sided possibility. 12 On this interpretation, points
[iii]- [vi] are intended to explain the notion of one-sided possibility introduced in [ii] .
Aristotle does so by establishing, in point [v] , a number of theses characteristic of one-sided but not two-sided possibility. By contrast, point [vii] is again about two-sided possibility, 10 [iii] ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, φανερὸν ἔκ τε τῶν ἀποφάσεων καὶ τῶν καταφάσεων τῶν ἀντικειμένων·
[iv] τὸ γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκη μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἤτοι ταὐτά ἐστιν ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ ἀλλήλοις, [v] ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα τούτοις, τὸ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἤτοι ταὐτὰ ἔσται ἢ ἀκολουθοῦντα ἀλλήλοις· [vi] κατὰ παντὸς γὰρ ἡ φάσις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις.
[vii] ἔσται ἄρα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνδεχόμενον. In point [vi] of this passage, φάσις is used in place of κατάφασις to mean 'affirmation' (Waitz 1844 : 403, Bonitz 1870 it is not possible to belong it is possible to belong it is impossible to belong it is not impossible to belong it is necessary not to belong it is not necessary not to belong Hintikka 1973 : 32-4, 1977 : 81, Patterson 1995 : 270, Nortmann 1996 .
14 τὸ (οὐκ) ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν. The combination of the definite article τὸ with the finite verb ἐνδέχεται in points
[iv] and [v] indicates that Aristotle is concerned with linguistic expressions rather than with non-linguistic items signified by expressions; cf. Categories 10 12b5-16. Where X is a pair of expressions as described above:
PNC: Not both the affirmation and the denial hold of X LEM: Either the affirmation or the denial holds of X As we will see shortly, both PNC and LEM play an important role in Aristotle's argument in
In point [iv] , Aristotle states that the three expressions on the left-hand side of Whenever A and B are so related that it is not possible for them to belong to the same thing at the same time, but necessarily one or the other of them belongs to everything, Prior Analytics 1.13, but takes it for granted since he regards it as the firmest of all principles.
Establishing one-sided possibility in De interpretatione 13 (22b11-14)
In 9-16, 237.14-15, Seel 1982 : 149, Weidemann 2002 ; thus it suffices for our purposes to consider only one expression of possibility. For the sake of brevity, I shall write 'necessary' as shorthand for 'necessary to be', 'possible not' as shorthand for 'possible not to be', and so on. Aristotle asserts that the first expression in each quadrant of the square implies the second and third expressions (22a14-23). For example, 'possible' implies 'not impossible' in the sense that, for any X, if the former holds of X then the latter holds of X. 27 Likewise, 'possible' implies 'not necessary', and so on. Aristotle does not assert that the expressions in each quadrant are mutually equivalent, nor does he assert that the second or third expression implies the first expression. 28 Rather, his focus is on determining what follows from the first expression in each quadrant.
Unfortunately, as Aristotle goes on to explain at 22b10-28, the above square turns out to be incoherent. The incoherence is best described as being due to the ambiguity of 'possible' between the two-sided and the one-sided sense. Although Aristotle does not explicitly distinguish between these two senses in De interpretatione 13, the distinction underlies his discussion of the incoherence. In the left-hand column of the square, 'possible (not)' is taken to imply 'not necessary (not)'. This implication requires that 'possible' be understood not in the one-sided sense but in the two-sided sense. In the right-hand column, by contrast, 'not possible' is taken to imply 'necessary not', and 'not possible not' is taken to imply 'necessary'.
These implications require that the occurrences of 'possible' in these phrases be understood not in the two-sided but in the one-sided sense. For if 'possible' is understood in the two-sided sense, then 'not possible' does not imply 'necessary not' but only the disjunctive phrase 27 I use 'imply' as the converse of Aristotle's 'follow' (ἀκολουθεῖν) at 22a14-37. Thus, an expression implies another expression just in case the latter follows from the former. Hintikka's (1973: 45-7) suggestion that ἀκολουθεῖν at 22a14-37 signifies the mutual equivalence of expressions is not convincing; cf. Bluck 1963 : 216-17, Frede 1976 : 239-40, Brandon 1978 : 175-7, Seel 1982 : 148-9, Weidemann 2002 : 425, 2012 : 109. However, Aristotle's square in Table 2 violates LEM. For example, consider the affirmative sentence 'It is possible for every man to be an animal' and the corresponding negative sentence 'It is not possible for every man to be an animal'. LEM requires that at least one of them be true. But according to Aristotle's square, 'possible' is to be understood as expressing two-sided possibility in the affirmative sentence, and as expressing one-sided possibility in the negative sentence. As a result, LEM is violated because neither sentence is true (since it is necessary for every man to be an animal).
29 Cf. Pr. An. 1.17 37a9-26.
30 See Ackrill 1963 : 151, Bluck 1963 : 215-16, Seel 1982 : 160, Whitaker 1996 : 162-4, Weidemann 2002 Due to the homonymy of 'possible', the occurrence of 'possible' and 'not possible' in Aristotle's square fail to be a genuine opposed pair of affirmation and denial. 33 For in a genuine opposed pair the same thing must be denied and affirmed of the same thing not homonymously:
Let us call an affirmation and a denial which are opposite a contradiction (ἀντίφασις).
I speak of sentences as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing -not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists. (De int. 6 17a33-7)
According to this definition, 'not possible' fails to be the contradictory opposite of 'possible' in Aristotle's square. On the other hand, Aristotle holds that for every affirmation there is a corresponding denial which is its contradictory opposite, and that for every denial there is a corresponding affirmation which is its contradictory opposite (17a30-3). Hence, if 'possible' has the two-sided sense in a given affirmation, there must be a corresponding denial in which it has the same sense. And if 'possible' has the one-sided sense in a given denial, there must be a corresponding affirmation in which it has the same sense. Given this, Aristotle is in a position to construct a revised square in which 'possible' has the same sense throughout, and which therefore does not suffer from the problems described above.
In De interpretatione 13, Aristotle chooses to construct a revised square for one-sided possibility (he does not give a square for two-sided possibility). As a first step toward this revised square, Aristotle argues that 'necessary' implies 'possible', as follows:
[i] What is necessary to be is possible to be.
[ii] For otherwise the denial will follow,
[iii] since it is necessary either to affirm or to deny; [iv] Ackrill (1963: 152) , who holds that when Aristotle 'claims that 'necessary' must imply 'possible' since otherwise it would have to imply 'not possible' he is, of course, misusing the principle of excluded middle'.
Similarly, Fitting & Mendelsohn (1998: 34) phrase indicates a general term true of everything of which 'necessary to be' holds. In [v] , by contrast, the phrase picks out a particular item, Y, of which 'necessary to be' holds (Weidemann 2012: 441) .
This argument relies on three premisses. First, it relies on LEM (line 5, stated in [iii]). The second premiss is that 'not possible' implies 'impossible ' (line 7, stated in [iv] ). The third premiss is that 'impossible' and 'necessary' are disjoint in that they do not hold of the same thing (line 10, stated in [vi] ). This last premiss makes it clear that 'impossible' is taken to mean 'not one-sided possible' rather than 'not two-sided possible'. This is a substantive assumption because 'impossible' is also occasionally used in the latter sense in De interpretatione 13. 38 It follows that 'not possible', since it implies 'impossible', is disjoint from 'necessary'. This means that the negated occurrence of 'possible' in 'not possible' does not have the two-sided sense but the one-sided sense; for if it had the two-sided sense, 'not possible' would mean 'not twosided possible' and would fail to be disjoint from 'necessary' (in fact, it would follow from it).
Thus, the second and third premisses taken together entail that a negated occurrence of 'possible' has the one-sided sense.
Based on this, Aristotle's argument establishes, by means of LEM, that an unnegated occurrence of 'possible' has the one-sided sense. For if the argument's conclusion in line 12 is to be true, the unnegated occurrence of 'possible' in it cannot have the two-sided sense but must have the one-sided sense. 39 This is the first unnegated occurrence of 'possible' that is used in the one-sided sense in De interpretatione 12 and 13. Prior to Aristotle's argument at 22b11-14, all unnegated occurrences of 'possible' in these chapters are understood in the twosided sense. 40 Aristotle's argument shows that unnegated occurrences of 'possible' can have the one-sided sense too.
The revised square of modal expressions (De interpretatione 13 22b10-28)
Having shown that 'necessary' implies 'possible', Aristotle goes on to argue that the left-hand column of his original square is incorrect and in need of revision. In particular, he argues that, contrary to what he said at the beginning of chapter 13, 'possible' does not imply 'not 38 For example, 'impossible' presumably means 'not two-sided possible' in Aristotle's claim that 'not impossible' implies 'not necessary' (22b15-16); see Seel 1982 : 161-3, Weidemann 2002 necessary'. For otherwise -since 'necessary' implies 'possible' -it would follow that 'necessary' implies 'not necessary', which is absurd (22b14-17). Nor does 'possible' imply 'necessary' or 'necessary not ' (b17-22) . From this Aristotle concludes that the only expression concerning necessity that can be implied by 'possible' is 'not necessary not' (b22-8).
Thus, Aristotle revises his original square by transposing 'not necessary' and 'not necessary not' in the left-hand column:
possible to be not possible to be not impossible to be impossible to be not necessary not to be necessary not to be possible not to be not possible not to be not impossible not to be impossible not to be not necessary to be necessary to be In this revised square, 'possible' is not ambiguous but is consistently used in the one-sided sense throughout. Accordingly, 'impossible' means 'not one-sided possible'. As before, Aristotle holds that the first expression in each quadrant implies the second and third expressions.
The top half of the revised square corresponds exactly to the two groups of modal expressions discussed by Aristotle in his argument for one-sided possibility in Prior Analytics 1.13 (see Table 1 ). This argument can easily be adapted to capture the bottom half of the revised square. Thus, Aristotle's discussion in Prior Analytics only more concise and straightforward than the one in De interpretatione 13; it is also more powerful in that it establishes the equivalence of the three expressions in each quadrant of the square. In particular, it establishes the two equivalences that guarantee the interdefinability of one-sided possibility and necessity, namely, the equivalence of 'possible' and 'not necessary not', and -provided that the argument is adapted to the bottom half of the square -the equivalence of 'necessary' and 'not possible not'.
Despite these differences, the arguments in Prior Analytics 1.13 and De interpretatione 13 share important similarities. First, they are both of an extensional nature in that they prove implications (or equivalences) between modal expressions by showing that the one expression holds of everything of which the other holds (and vice versa). Moreover, they both aim to establish the one-sided sense of unnegated occurrences of 'possible' by appealing to the onesided sense of negated occurrences of 'possible'. They do so by invoking the law of excluded middle (LEM). Among other things, this law encodes Aristotle's commitment to the principle that for every denial in which something is denied of something there is a corresponding affirmation in which the same thing is affirmed of the same thing not homonymously. It follows from this principle that for every negated occurrence of 'possible' in a denial there is a corresponding unnegated occurrence in an affirmation such that both occurrences have the same sense. If the negated occurrences has the one-sided sense, the unnegated occurrence must have the one-sided sense too.
Aristotle's strategy in both arguments shows that, in his view, negated occurrences of 'possible' are most naturally interpreted in the one-sided sense, whereas unnegated occurrences are more naturally interpreted in the two-sided sense. For Aristotle, one-sided readings of unnegated occurrences are somewhat artificial and stand in need of justification.
Aristotle does not explain why this is so. Contemporary theorists have provided an explanation on his behalf by appealing to the Gricean concept of conversational implicature.
These theorists disagree with Aristotle that there are two distinct senses of 'possible'. Instead, they argue that there is only the one-sided sense, and that the two sided interpretation is a pragmatic phenomenon resulting from a conversational implicature. For example, Lauri
Karttunen writes:
Aristotle distinguished between one-sided possibility and two-sided possibility. . . .
However, I doubt that there is any need to postulate these two distinct senses. As far as I understand it, Aristotle's distinction is designed to account for the same facts that are also covered by Grice's conversational postulates. Assuming that the speaker is following the cooperative principle by saying that something is possible, he indicates that he is not in the position to make a stronger statement [to the effect that that thing is necessary]. . . . Therefore, for all he knows, the contrary is also possible. The twosided interpretation of possible arises from these considerations; it is not part of the meaning of possible. 42 (Karttunen 1972: 6 n. 2) One of Grice's postulates governing cooperative communication is the requirement that the speaker is to provide the addressee with the strongest relevant information available. Thus, if the speaker asserts that something is one-sided possible she must have reasons to withhold from the stronger claim that it is necessary. On the assumption that the speaker knows whether or not the stronger claim is true, her assertion of the weaker claim gives rise to a conversational implicature to the effect that the stronger claim is false. 43 This helps explain why the two-sided interpretation of unnegated occurrences of 'possible' is usually preferred over the one-sided interpretation in ordinary language. It may also help explain why Aristotle felt the need to include an argument justifying the one-sided sense of unnegated 'possible' in Prior Analytics 1.13.
On the other hand, negation in ordinary language typically operates exclusively on the meaning of expressions but not on conversational implicatures that might be associated with them on a given occasion of use. 44 Thus, if a negation is applied to 'possible', it only negates its one-sided meaning but not the implicature that gives rise to its two-sided interpretation.
Consequently, 'not possible' is usually understood as 'not one-sided possible' rather than 'not two-sided possible' in ordinary language. This is to say, negated occurrences of 'possible' are usually interpreted as expressing one-sided possibility in ordinary language. In the Prior 43 For the same reason, an assertion of a particular affirmative sentence such as 'Some As are B' gives rise to a conversational implicature to the effect that the corresponding universal sentence 'All As are B' is false.
Accordingly, particular affirmative sentences can be used in a two-sided sense ('Some but not all As are B') and in a one-sided sense ('Some, perhaps all, As are B'). In Prior Analytics 1.1-22, particular sentences are used only in the one-sided sense, whereas 'possible' is frequently used in the two-sided sense (see Horn 1989: 209-10) . In the second book of the Prior Analytics, however, particular affirmative sentences are sometimes used in the twosided sense, when Aristotle takes 'Some As are B' to imply the particular negative sentence 'Some As are not B'
(Pr. An. 2.2 55a15, 2.3 56a15; see Waitz 1844 : 490-1, Ross 1949 : 431 and 433, Smith 1989 . Even in chapters 1.1-22, Aristotle is trying to avoid examples in which a particular sentence is true together with the corresponding universal sentence (Pr. An. 1.4 26a39-b10; see Patzig 1968 : 177-8, Brunschwig 1969 : 14-15, Ebert & Nortmann 2007 . When he must use such examples, he finds it necessary to explain this fact by pointing out that particular sentences are to be understood in the one-sided sense rather than in the two-sided sense (1.4 26b14-20, 1.5 27b20-23, 1.6 28b28-30), just as he finds it necessary to explain the one-sided sense of 'possible' in chapter 1.13. It is sometimes thought that Aristotle connects the one-sided use of 'possible' to the one-sided use of particular sentences at De interpretatione 13 23a16-18 (Seel 1982 : 167-9, Whitaker 1996 pace Pacius 1597b : 104, Weidemann 2002 . Whatever the correct interpretation of 23a16-18, the parallel between the one-sided uses of 'possible' and particular sentences is an apt one.
Analytics, Aristotle sometimes uses the phrase 'not possible' in the sense of 'not two-sided possible'. However, these uses are restricted to special contexts in which Aristotle explicitly indicates that the kind of possibility that is being negated is two-sided possibility. For example, he often says that 'what is necessary was not possible' in chapters 1.14-19 of the Prior Analytics.
45 By using the past tense form 'was', Aristotle indicates that he is referring to his official definition of two-sided possibility as the preferred notion of possibility introduced in chapter 1. 13 (32a18-20) .
46
Absent such explicit markers, the usual interpretation of negated occurrences of 'possible' is the one-sided one. Aristotle takes advantage of this fact in De interpretatione 13 when he takes it for granted that 'not possible' implies both 'impossible' and 'necessary not', and in Prior Analytics 1.13 when he takes it for granted that these three expressions are equivalent.
Finally, we are in a position to respond to an objection raised by Gisela Striker, who rejects the above interpretation of the argument in Prior Analytics 1.13 on the following grounds:
One might then think that these lines [1.13 32a21-8] are intended to explain the onesided sense of 'possible'. If so, however, one would expect something like the consideration mentioned at de Int. 13, 22b11-14 or 29-33: it would seem absurd to say that what is necessary is not possible (and hence impossible). But this does not seem to have worried Aristotle in the Analytics (cf. 33b17; 37a8-9; 38a35). (Striker 2009: 129) First, it is important to note that the passages mentioned by Striker at the end of this quotation are the ones in which Aristotle uses the past tense 'was' to make it clear that he is negating two-sided possibility but not one-sided possibility (see n. 45). These passages do not show that Aristotle is comfortable calling what is necessary 'not possible' when he has not made it clear that what is being negated is two-sided possibility. Moreover, there is no need for Aristotle in Prior Analytics 1.13 to invoke the consideration from De interpretatione 13, because the structure of his argument differs in the two chapters. The two arguments share a common goal, namely, to establish the one-sided sense of unnegated occurrences of 'possible'.
In the De interpretatione, Aristotle achieves this goal by invoking Striker's consideration to argue that 'possible' does not imply 'not necessary' but 'not necessary not'. In the Prior Analytics, he achieves the goal in a more powerful and elegant way by showing that 'possible' is equivalent to 'not necessary not'. 47
